Essay: When Patents Aren\u27t Enough: Why Biologics Necessitate Date Exclusivity Protection by Lybecker, Kristina M.
William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 40 | Issue 4 Article 7
2014
Essay: When Patents Aren't Enough: Why
Biologics Necessitate Date Exclusivity Protection
Kristina M. Lybecker
Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law
Recommended Citation
Lybecker, Kristina M. (2014) "Essay: When Patents Aren't Enough: Why Biologics Necessitate Date Exclusivity Protection," William





ESSAY: WHEN PATENTS AREN’T ENOUGH: 
WHY BIOLOGICS NECESSITATE DATA 
EXCLUSIVITY PROTECTION 
Kristina M. Lybecker† 
 I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................... 1427 
 II. BIOPHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT ........ 1430 
 III. THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT AND TRADITIONAL “SMALL 
MOLECULES” ........................................................................ 1432 
 IV. BIOLOGIC MEDICINES .......................................................... 1432 
 V. WHY PATENTS AREN’T ENOUGH .......................................... 1436 
 VI. THE IMPORTANCE OF DATA EXCLUSIVITY PROTECTIONS .... 1439 
 VII. CONCLUSION ....................................................................... 1441 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Biologic medicines are fundamentally different from 
traditional “small molecule” therapies and therefore present new 
challenges in designing the intellectual property architecture that 
will protect them.1 Protecting the intellectual property (IP) of 
 
        †   Dr. Kristina M. Lybecker is an Associate Professor of Economics at 
Colorado College in Colorado Springs, CO. BA, Macalester College; PhD, 
University of California, Berkeley. 
 1. Biopharmaceuticals are currently produced using one of two technology 
platforms and the active chemical substances can be classified as “large molecules” 
or “small molecules.” Historically, pharmaceuticals have been small, chemically 
manufactured molecules, and these molecules still comprise more than ninety 
percent of drugs currently available. “Small molecule” therapies are synthesized by 
chemical reactions between different organic and/or inorganic compounds. In 
comparison, biologics or large molecules are therapeutic proteins and are most 
often derived from living cells. See Small and Large Molecules: Drugs on a Chemical 
and Biological Basis, BAYER HEALTHCARE, http://www.bayerpharma.com/en 
/research-and-development/technologies/small-and-large-molecules/index.php 
(last visited Mar. 25, 2014). Biologics are produced from micro-organisms or 
animals by utilizing the metabolic processes of the organisms themselves. Biologics 
include insulin, monoclonal antibodies, vaccines, blood and blood products, 
protein hormones, cellular therapies, allergenic extracts, and gene therapy 
1
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biologics is complicated, difficult, and essential to the future of 
medicine. This new frontier is also one of the remaining hurdles in 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Trade Agreement negotia-
tions. The discussions currently center on a proposed twelve years 
of data exclusivity for biologics and the consequences data-
exclusivity will have for global public health and access to 
medicines. 
Data exclusivity is essential to the future of biologic medicines, 
but the nuances of their production greatly complicate the logistics 
of protecting their intellectual property. Data exclusivity protection 
allows for a period of time following marketing approval during 
which competing firms may not use the innovative firm’s safety and 
efficacy data—from proprietary preclinical and clinical trial 
results—to obtain marketing authorization for a generic version of 
the drug. Beginning when the compound first shows medicinal 
promise, the generation and compilation of this data is expensive 
and time consuming. Data exclusivity provides the innovator firm 
with a period of protection for its investment in clinical trials and 
data collection, regardless of the length of time required to bring 
the drug to market. 
Although complementary, patents and data exclusivity 
protection incentivize innovation in different ways and serve 
distinct purposes. Patents protect inventions that meet the 
standards of patentability and are novel, nonobvious, and useful. 
They protect innovations ranging from breakthrough discoveries to 
incremental improvements. Due to the length of the drug-
development and patent-approval processes, effective patent terms 
rarely correspond to FDA approval, the result of which is that 
innovative therapies may experience patent expiry shortly after 
making it to market. In contrast, data exclusivity protects the 
tremendous investments of time, talent, and financial resources 
required to establish a new therapy as safe and effective. This is 
accomplished by requiring competing firms seeking regulatory 
approval of the same or a similar product to independently 
generate the comprehensive preclinical and clinical trial data 
rather than rely on or use the innovator’s data. Alternatively, the 
competing firm may wait a set period of time before utilizing the 
 
products. Examples of biologics include: Adalimumab (Humira), Trastuzumab 
(Herceptin), Etanercept (Enbrel), Bevacizumab (Avastin), and Rituximab 
(Rituxan). 
2
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innovator’s prior approval in an abbreviated regulatory approval. 
Data exclusivity is not an extension of patent rights, and it does not 
preclude a third party from introducing a generic version of the 
innovator’s therapy during the data exclusivity period, provided 
that the innovator’s data is not used to secure marketing approval. 
In essence, data exclusivity protection incentivizes biopharma-
ceutical firms to invest in establishing the safety and efficacy of 
their product and prevents competitors from free riding on these 
efforts for a limited period of time. 
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act 
of 1984, commonly called the Hatch-Waxman Act,2 provided 
innovative drug firms with a period of patent extension as well as a 
period of data exclusivity, in the hopes of providing a return on 
their investment and an incentive for future innovation. These 
protections have been crucial to the development of the innovative 
drugs and therapies that currently enhance and extend life. They 
are even more critical to the future of the biopharmaceutical 
industry and the development of medicines that are more targeted 
and more complex.  
In an analysis of the appropriate length of data exclusivity, a 
financial model was utilized to determine how long the exclusivity 
period must be to provide a typical pioneer biologic a positive 
return on investment. Drawing on a representative portfolio of 
pioneer biologics, the break-even period ranges from thirteen to 
sixteen years.3 An appropriate period of protection is essential if 
the promise of biologics is to come to fruition. Beyond the 
importance of biologics to public health and longevity, innovation 
is crucial to trade and economic prosperity. As evidence of the 
importance of these sectors, in 2011 IP-intensive industries 
exported more than $1 trillion in goods and services, which 
accounted for approximately seventy-four percent of total 2011 
U.S. exports.4 Moreover, the biopharmaceutical industry is a 
significant contributor. The biopharmaceutical industry of the 
United States is the fourth-largest U.S. exporter among IP-intensive 
 
 2. Hatch-Waxman Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 21 and 35 U.S.C.). 
 3. Henry Grabowski et al., From the Analyst’s Couch: Data Exclusivity for 
Biologics, 10 NATURE REVIEWS: DRUG DISCOVERY 15, 15–25 (2011) . 
 4. IP Creates Jobs for America, GLOBAL INTELL. PROP. CENTER (May 25, 2012), 
http://www.theglobalipcenter.com/ip-creates-jobs-america. 
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industries, with exports valued at $49.4 billion in 2010.5 
Accordingly, the TPP Trade Agreement should include the 
proposed twelve years of data exclusivity and provide innovative 
firms with the incentives needed to continue to invest in the 
breakthrough therapies that will extend and enhance life for years 
to come. 
II. BIOPHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 
The pharmaceutical industry is distinguished from other 
knowledge-intensive industries in some very important ways. It is 
uniquely set apart by the manufacture of a social good 
characterized by high fixed costs, substantial informational and 
regulatory costs, and relatively low marginal costs of production. 
The apparatus embodied in the patent system encourages 
additional pharmaceutical research and development (R&D) by 
guaranteeing innovators a period of exclusivity during which they 
are able to recover their R&D investments. 
The intellectual property rights protection is of particular 
importance to biopharmaceutical innovators, given that without 
these measures innovators would have little incentive to invest in 
new technologies that suffer from several market failures. The 
production of knowledge––as embodied in biopharmaceutical 
therapies––is characterized by the three sources of market failure.6 
First, information has one of the classic properties of public goods 
and the externalities inherent to them: once discovered, knowledge 
is both nonrival and nonexcludable. The cost of R&D is primarily a 
fixed cost, while the marginal cost of production is very low. For 
biopharmaceutical innovators, new technologies are easily copied 
and sold by their competitors. Given the inherent challenges in 
delineating and enforcing property rights to new technologies, it is 
difficult for innovative firms to appropriate the returns accruing 
from their investments. Accordingly, these investments may not be 
made and pharmaceutical R&D would be under-produced. 
 
 5. ECON. & STATISTICS ADMIN. & U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE U.S. ECONOMY (2012), available at http://www 
.uspto.gov/news/publications/IP_Report_March_2012.pdf. 
 6. Kenneth Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, 
in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 
609, 609–26 (Univs.-Nat’l Bureau ed., 1962) . 
4
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Second, another source of market failure stems from the 
indivisibility of new knowledge. That is, its propensity to be discrete 
rather than continuous in nature. This frequently results in 
economies of scale and scope in the production of new knowledge. 
In the biopharmaceutical industry, the R&D required for the 
discovery of a new therapy is characterized by a large fixed cost. 
Finally, the third source of market failure emanates from the 
degree of risk and uncertainty inherent in the production of new 
knowledge. 
The presence of these market failures decreases the 
probability that the rate of investment in the development and 
diffusion of such technology will occur at the socially optimal level. 
Given this, the remedy is to implement policies focused on 
encouraging the development and diffusion of these technologies. 
Intellectual property rights protection provides the market 
exclusivity that incentivizes firms to invest in the difficult and 
expensive R&D necessary for pharmaceutical advances. This 
incentive system is the heart of the static/dynamic trade-off that 
characterizes the existing patent system. In exchange for temporary 
monopoly power (twenty years under the existing patent system), a 
static loss, new knowledge is forever brought into the public 
domain, a dynamic gain. 
The protection afforded innovators under the patent system is 
all the more important for the pharmaceutical industry due to the 
tremendous costs of bringing a new medicine to market. Current 
estimates place the fixed costs of drug development at close to 
$1.2 billion. Granted, this is a highly controversial number, but 
even if the cost is half that amount, it remains a significant 
investment. The development of new drugs also requires a great 
deal of time. On the road to approval by the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), 5000 to 10,000 experimental compounds 
are considered and after a period of ten to fifteen years typically 
only one gains approval. Moreover, the few successes must make up 
for the many failures, because only three out of every ten medicines 
will recoup the money spent on their development. And at the 
same time, the uniqueness of their product is threatened by the 
fact it is very easy to copy. Innovator firms lose out if nobody else 
has to bear the development cost and can still sell the drugs. 
5
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III. THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT AND TRADITIONAL “SMALL 
MOLECULES” 
As described elsewhere in this Issue on the thirtieth 
anniversary of the Hatch-Waxman Act, the pharmaceutical industry 
is characterized by high fixed costs of production and marketing 
and relatively low marginal costs of production.7 While innovator 
firms are required to invest significant resources and bear 
substantial risk, generic producers must neither invest in the R&D 
of these medicines nor risk a production failure. The Hatch-
Waxman Act provides a tradeoff that allows innovator firms and 
generic producers to share the market. The Act facilitates generic 
production while maintaining the necessary financial incentives for 
R&D by the innovators. Fundamentally, generic producers are able 
to submit evidence of bioequivalence in place of independent 
clinical data, resulting in tremendous cost savings. This is 
complemented by a period of additional marketing exclusivity for 
innovator firms, in order to partially compensate them for the 
patent life lost to clinical testing and regulatory approval. 
Importantly, this extension is in addition to the twenty years of 
exclusivity granted by the issuance of a patent and it cannot exceed 
five years.8 This tradeoff rewards generic producers with lower 
costs, innovator firms with additional exclusivity, and consumers 
with competition and lower drug prices following patent expiry. 
The result is arguably economically efficient for several 
reasons. First, through the bioequivalence provision, the Hatch-
Waxman Act eliminates redundant clinical testing and the 
associated expenditures. In addition, competition necessitates 
more efficient production, lower costs, and savings, all of which are 
passed on to patients. This has created a robust, successful U.S. 
generic industry, and seventy-five percent of all prescriptions 
dispensed are now generics. 
IV. BIOLOGIC MEDICINES 
Having acquired some understanding of the biopharma-
ceutical R&D process, as well as the role of patents in protecting 
 
 7. See Robert A. Armitage, The Hatch-Waxman Act: A Path Forward for Making It 
More Modern, 40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1200, 1219–23 (2014). 
 8. See 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2006); see also WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21129, PHARMACEUTICAL PATENT TERM EXTENSIONS 2 
(2002). 
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“small molecules,” it is important to establish why and in what ways 
biologics differ. The first important distinction between “small 
molecules” and biologics is based in their chemical structures. The 
chemical structures of traditional “small molecule” pharmaceuticals 
are commonly well defined. Given this, laboratory analysis is 
generally able to determine all of the components, and replication 
(generic production) is quite straightforward. Alternatively, 
biologics are very difficult and sometimes impossible to 
characterize scientifically due to the complexity of their chemical 
structure. Perhaps surprisingly, a number of the components of a 
finished biologic may be unknown.9 For obvious reasons this greatly 
complicates the production of “generic” versions. Accordingly, the 
FDA has struggled to establish “interchangeability” for complex 
proteins. In contrast to conventional “small molecule” drugs for 
which a generic drug can be chemically established to be the same 
as an innovator drug, a biosimilar is a molecule that is similar but 
not identical to the pioneer biologic. 
A biologic is commonly defined as “a large molecule typically 
derived from living cells and used in the treatment, diagnosis or 
prevention of disease. Biologic medicines include therapeutic 
proteins, DNA vaccines, monoclonal antibodies, and fusion 
proteins.”10 In addition, the majority of biologics are produced 
using recombinant DNA technology and are made by genetically 
engineering living cells to produce the required proteins (rather 
than through chemical synthesis). As a result, biologics are 
considerably larger than “small molecule” drugs, often 200 to 1000 
times their size and significantly more complex structurally. 
Consequently, biologics are much more sensitive to even minute 
changes in the manufacturing process. Due to both the size and 
sensitivity of biologics, these medicines are most frequently 
administered through an injection or infusion into a patient’s 
body. 
Biologics are therefore more difficult to characterize and to 
produce such that even minor differences in production processes 
or cell lines can generate variations in the resulting protein. As a 
consequence, quality control is all the more important, and 
production complications are potentially more catastrophic. 
 
 9. How Do Drugs and Biologics Differ?, BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY ORG. (Nov. 
10, 2010), http://www.bio.org/articles/how-do-drugs-and-biologics-differ. 
 10. Biologics and Biosimilars: An Overview, AMGEN 12 (2012), http://www 
.amgen.com/pdfs/misc/Biologics_and_Biosimilars_Overview.pdf . 
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Several recent examples starkly illustrate this possibility. Consider 
the 500 cases of fungal meningitis linked to contaminated 
injectable corticosteroids formulated by the New England 
Compounding Center in October 2012, and the 150 deaths 
resulting from tainted Chinese heparin in 2008.11 Unfortunately, 
immunogenicity problems may even result from small changes 
made by the innovator company under controlled conditions. Note 
the case of EPREX as described by the Biotechnology Industry 
Organization: 
Immunogenicity is an important concern regarding 
the safety of biologics. This occurs when our bodies treat a 
protein as if it is a foreign substance and try to attack the 
protein with antibodies. Unlike chemical drugs, all 
biologics have the potential to stimulate antibody 
production in patients and such responses are highly 
unpredictable. Sometimes the antibodies produced in 
response to a biologic have no effect. Other times they 
bind and inactivate the biologic, causing disease 
progression. In still other cases, they can bind to and 
inactivate a patient’s naturally occurring protein, which 
means that the patient may be left with no options other 
than regular blood transfusions. 
One example of immunogenicity occurred a few years 
ago when, at the request of the European Health 
Authorities, Johnson & Johnson made a change in the 
manufacturing process for its EPREX product––a product 
that had been marketed for a decade with no evidence of 
immunogenicity problems. The change caused a serious 
adverse reaction in a small number of patients. These 
patients lost their ability to make red blood cells because 
they produced an antibody (triggered by the EPREX) that 
inactivated both the administered protein (EPREX) and 
the body’s natural protein that is essential for red blood 
cell production. Johnson & Johnson eventually was able to 
determine the cause of this adverse reaction and correct 
it, but only after a very lengthy and expensive 
investigation. 
The EPREX case shows that one protein can be 
different from another in ways that cannot be detected in 
the laboratory, but are seen only by the body’s exquisitely 
 
 11. Larry Greenmeier, Heparin Scare: Deaths from Tainted Blood-Thinner Spur 
Race for Safe Replacement, SCI. AM. (Nov. 4, 2008), http://www.scientificamerican 
.com/article/heparin-scare-deaths/. 
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sensitive immune system. If one change to a well-
established complex manufacturing process, made by the 
manufacturer who has intimate knowledge of the process, 
can cause a problem with immunogenicity, surely the risk 
is even greater with an entirely new manufacturer and 
process––as will be the case with follow-on biologics.12 
Given that a minute change in the production process, raw 
materials, temperature, pH, or cell line can result in a significant 
alteration in the medicine’s quality, efficacy, or safety, the 
interchangeability and substitutability of these products must be 
approached with extreme caution. This is all the more critical given 
the increasing importance and prevalence of biologics in the 
pipeline of the biopharmaceutical industry. To date, approximately 
200 biologic therapies have transformed the lives of more than 
800 million patients.13 Moreover, by 2017 analysts believe that 
biologics will comprise seven of the top ten global pharmaceuticals, 
and that thirty percent of the pharmaceutical industry pipeline will 
be biologics.14 
The distinctions that separate “small molecules” from biologic 
medicines also generate very different economic outcomes in the 
context of generic/biosimilar production. In the case of “small 
molecules,” the emergence of a successful generic industry has 
created competition through which prices have dropped 
dramatically. Much of the debate surrounding data exclusivity for 
biologics centers on the mistaken belief that prices would similarly 
drop with the development of biosimilar competition. Accordingly, 
the fear is that data exclusivity protection will lock in high prices 
for biologic drugs. This argument was precisely the focus of a 
recent letter from the AARP to U.S. Trade Representative Michael 
Froman.15 Unfortunately, the cost savings achieved with generic 
production and competition among “small molecule” drugs is 
 
 12. Why Is Patient Safety a Concern in the Biosimilars Debate?, BIOTECHNOLOGY 
INDUSTRY ORG. (Nov. 10, 2010), http://www.bio.org/articles/why-patient-safety 
-concern-biosimilars-debate. 
 13. BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUS. ORG., GUIDE TO BIOTECHNOLOGY 2008, at 84 
(2008), available at http://www.bio.org/sites/default/files/BiotechGuide2008.pdf. 
 14. Why Biologics Matter: Biologics Contributing to Rising Healthcare Costs, 
SANDOZ BIOPHARMACEUTICALS, http://www.sandoz-biosimilars.com/biosimilars2 
/why_biologics_matter.shtml# (last visited March 25, 2014). 
 15. Ben Goad, AARP Warns Trade Deal Could Lock in High Drug Prices, THE HILL 
(Oct. 23, 2013, 7:29 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/regwatch/healthcare/330199 
-trade-agreement-could-lock-in-high-drug-prices-aarp-warns. 
9
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unlikely to be available through biosimilars. For conventional 
“small molecule” drugs, over the necessary three to five years for 
development of a generic, the cost is approximately one to five 
million dollars, resulting in a lower-cost alternative for patients.16 In 
contrast, the majority of shortcuts available to generic 
manufacturers will not be available to biosimilar producers.17 
Industry experts expect biosimilar firms to need to invest in clinical 
trials as well as manufacturing and post-approval safety monitoring 
programs similar to those of the innovative biologic company. 
Accordingly, biosimilar products will likely require eight to ten 
years to develop, at a cost of $75–250 million.18 Current studies 
place the cost savings from biosimilar production at between ten 
and twenty percent less than the cost of the pioneer biologic. The 
European experience provides data showing that biosimilars offer 
just a ten percent discount from the brand.19 
V. WHY PATENTS AREN’T ENOUGH 
Patents protect traditional “small molecule” drugs for a twenty-
year term. However, biologic therapies are more challenging to 
comprehensively protect with patents due to their complexity, size, 
and the large number of similar effective variants.20 As described 
above, comprehensive protection is critical to the future 
 
 16. While innovator firms bear the entire cost of pharmaceutical research 
and development, including the costs of all of the molecules that fail, generic 
producers must only reverse engineer the innovative drug and establish its 
bioequivalence. This translates into significantly lower development costs for 
generic producers. 
 17. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE: S. 1695 BIOLOGICS PRICE 
COMPETITION AND INNOVATION ACT OF 2007 (2008), available at http://www.cbo.gov 
/ftpdocs/94xx/doc9496/s1695.pdf. 
 18. Biologics and Biosimilars: An Overview, supra note 10, at 12; The European 
Biosimilars Market: Trends and Key Success Factors, SCICASTS (Oct. 27, 2008), 
http://scicasts.com/subscribe/9-special-reports/bio-it-a-biotechnology/2152-the 
-european-biosimilars-market-trends-and-key-success-factors. 
 19. Peyton Howell, How Much Cheaper Will Biosimilars Be?, FIERCEPHARMA 
(Mar. 2, 2012), http://www.fiercepharma.com/story/how-much-cheaper-will 
-biosimilars-be/2012-03-02. 
 20. Jonathan Stroud, Power Without a Patent: Twelve-Year Biologics Data 
Exclusivity Period and a Totality-of-the-Evidence Standard for Biosimilarity, OMICS GRP. 
http://www.omicsgroup.com/conferences/ACS/conference/download-pdf.php 
?file=7593-Speaker-Pdf-T.pdf (last visited Apr. 16, 2014) (abstract of presentation 
at Second International Conference and Exhibition on Biowaivers and 
Biosimilars). 
10
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production of biologics due to the investment and risk associated 
with their discovery and manufacture. Recent studies estimate that 
the preapproval cost of developing a biologic approaches 
$1.2 billion and that the time needed to recover the preapproval 
R&D costs is between 12.9 and 16.2 years.21 This shaves vital years 
off the effective patent life of these medicines. In the United States, 
the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009 
(“Biologics Act”) provides for twelve years of exclusivity for biologic 
medicines.22 With its passage, Congress endeavored to fill the void 
left by other forms of intellectual property rights in the protection 
of biologics, specifically patents and trade secrets. While the period 
of data protection for “small molecule” drugs is five years, the 
length of this exclusivity is less important because generic drugs are 
required to contain the identical active ingredient. That said, an 
accompanying article in this journal makes an excellent case for 
extending the length of exclusivity granted to certain “small 
molecule” drugs for unmet medical needs.23 Nevertheless, in the 
case of biosimilars, an identical active ingredient is not necessary; 
similar effective variants are sufficient. Put simply, the regulatory 
approval process does not require identity with the pioneer 
biologic product it references, hence the source of the potential 
patent protection gap.  
Given this, without an extended period of data exclusivity 
protection, a competing firm would be able to elude the 
innovator’s patent (since its compound is adequately different) 
while relying on the innovator’s data for regulatory approval. The 
industry argues that this potential is exacerbated by two issues: 
First, because of the nature of biologic products—large 
molecules produced by living cells and organisms through 
highly specific processes—patent protection is often 
narrower than that of small molecule drugs. Second, the 
creation of an abbreviated pathway for approval of similar 
 
 21. Joseph A. DiMasi & Henry G. Grabowski, The Costs of Biopharmaceutical 
R&D: Is Biotech Different?, 28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 469, 476 (2007); 
Grabowski et al., supra note 3, at 15–25. 
 22. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 7001-
7003, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of title 28, 29, 35, and 
42 U.S.C.) (enacting Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 
H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. (2010)). 
 23. Armitage, supra note 7, at 1250–57. 
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biological products creates new and strong incentives for 
competitors to exploit this patent protection gap.24 
It is important to recognize that while patent protection and data 
exclusivity may be considered complementary forms of protection, 
they serve distinct purposes. Patents protect innovations that meet 
the patentability standards and are thus novel, nonobvious, and 
useful, covering both breakthrough advances and incremental 
improvements. On the other hand, data protection incentivizes the 
costly and time-consuming development work, which is required to 
establish safety and efficacy and to secure regulatory approval of a 
new product. This complementary protection necessitates that 
biosimilar manufacturers independently conduct the compre-
hensive preclinical and clinical trials for their own product, or wait 
the twelve years specified by the Biologics Act before requesting a 
regulatory shortcut to approval based on the innovator’s prior 
approval and data. This protection both safeguards the innovator’s 
investments while also ensuring patient safety, especially given the 
sensitivity and complexity of biologic medicines.25 
The growing importance of biologic medicines draws the 
attention of generic producers, policymakers, public health 
advocates, and patient groups. Costs are significant and potential 
competition is of great interest to all parties. However, there are 
important distinctions between the production of “small molecule” 
generics and biosimilars. As noted above, biosimilar producers are 
not required to demonstrate that their products contain the 
identical active ingredient. Given this, biosimilars are exactly that, 
similar, but not identical generic versions of pioneer biologics. As 
such, the framework established by the Hatch-Waxman Act will not 
apply in the same way to biosimilars. If independent, 
comprehensive preclinical and clinical trials are required of 
biosimilar manufacturers, the industry tradeoff will not apply. 
Moreover, the cost savings generated by generic competition in 
“small molecule” markets will probably not materialize in biosimilar 
markets. The economic efficiencies generated by the Hatch-
Waxman Act in the market for “small molecules” will not be 
present in the markets for biologic medicines. 
 
 24. The Trans-Pacific Partnership and Innovation in the Bioeconomy: The Need 
for 12 Years of Data Protection for Biologics, BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY ORG. 4 
(July 18, 2013), http://www.bio.org/sites/default/files/TPP%20White%20Paper 
%20_2_.pdf. 
 25. See generally id. 
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VI. THE IMPORTANCE OF DATA EXCLUSIVITY PROTECTIONS 
Data exclusivity protection is vital to the development of future 
biologics and the preservation of the incentives needed to 
encourage investment in the R&D that makes these drugs a reality. 
As described above, recent studies estimate that the pre-approval 
cost of developing a biologic approaches $1.2 billion and that the 
time needed to recover the pre-approval R&D costs is between 12.9 
and 16.2 years.26 The remaining effective patent life provides 
innovators with their only opportunity to appropriate the returns 
on their investments. The profitability of this limited period 
determines whether or not future investments will be made. 
Undermining the future of this technology with weakened 
intellectual property protection for the limited cost savings 
anticipated through biosimilar competition is undeniably short 
sighted. The incentives to invest in biologic vaccines and therapies 
must be preserved with twelve years of data exclusivity. 
Accordingly, the current negotiations surrounding the TPP 
Trade Agreement include provisions for twelve years of data 
exclusivity for biologics. The TTP Trade Agreement is presently 
under negotiation by the United States and eleven other countries: 
Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, 
Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam.27 The 
agreement will promote trade and investment among member 
countries as well as encourage economic growth and development, 
innovation, and job creation. Given the importance and size of the 
economies of the participating nations and their share of global 
trade, the TPP Trade Agreement is among the most significant of 
recent trade agreements. Specifically, the eleven other TPP 
countries have a combined population of 482 million and generate 
close to fifteen percent of global trade.28 In combination, the 
current TPP countries represent the largest U.S. market for exports 
of goods and services. In 2012, TPP countries consumed forty-five 
 
 26. DiMasi & Grabowski, supra note 21, at 470; Grabowski et al., supra note 3, 
at 15–25. 
 27. Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Statement of the 
Ministers and Heads of Delegation for the Trans-Pacific P’ship Countries (Dec. 10, 
2013), http://www.ustr.gov/tpp. 
 28. BUS. ROUNDTABLE, THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT: AN 
OPPORTUNITY FOR AMERICA 1 (2013), available at http://businessroundtable.org 
/studies-reports/downloads/TPP_Summary_Oct_2013.pdf. 
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percent of exported U.S. goods.29 The agreement seeks to eliminate 
all trade tariffs; promote free trade; and comprehensively addresses 
trade in goods and services, rules of origin, trade remedies, non-
tariff barriers to trade, intellectual property, competition policy, 
and government procurement policy. The negotiations are 
ongoing, but a number of sticking points have greatly slowed their 
progress. Specific issues include policies surrounding investment, 
the environment and climate change, e-commerce, public 
procurement, agricultural export subsidies, and intellectual 
property rights. 
For the biopharmaceutical industry, a global standard of 
protection is essential to ensure the innovator firm receives a 
return on its investment, as well as for ensuring the safety and 
efficacy of these medicines. Moreover, trade and IP protection 
enhance growth, and growth furthers access to medicines. A 2006 
United Nations Industrial Development Organization report 
studied the role of intellectual property rights in technology 
transfer and economic growth in advanced nations, concluding 
that evidence suggests that strengthening intellectual property 
rights raises growth, in part due to increased innovation and 
technology diffusion. In addition, for middle-income countries, 
data indicate that stronger intellectual property rights regimes 
facilitate both domestic innovation and technology diffusion 
through foreign patenting and international trade, which can 
positively impact growth.30 A 2012 study further supports these 
conclusions, finding that “patent protection enhances innovation 
and economic growth, in countries where the capacity to conduct 
innovative [R&D] exists.”31 Intellectual property rights encourage 
growth, and growth enhances access. History supports this 
argument as well. The strength of these linkages is evident in the 
recent experiences of China, India, and Brazil. In the ten-year 
 
 29. Id. at 2. 
 30. Rod Falvey et al., The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Technology Transfer 
and Economic Growth: Theory and Evidence (United Nations Indus. Dev. Org., 




 31. Yee Kyoung Kim et al., Appropriate Intellectual Property Protection and 
Economic Growth in Countries at Different Levels of Development, 41 RES. POL’Y 358, 358 
(2012).  
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period between 1995 and 2005, these three nations doubled or 
nearly doubled their Patent Rights Index rating.32 Significantly, in 
the same period both biotechnology patenting and technology 
transfer, as captured by Foreign Direct Investment, increased 
substantially.33 These studies all point to the importance of 
encouraging innovation, supporting intellectual property 
protection, and including data exclusivity protections for 
development and growth. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
History has repeatedly shown that technology evolves faster 
than the legal architecture that surrounds it. The provision of data 
exclusivity protections is a straightforward legal step to catch up to 
the science that brings us biologic medicines. Biologic medicines 
are critical to the healthcare advances of the future, and data 
exclusivity is vital to innovative biologics. The period of data 
exclusivity provides innovators with an incentive to invest in the 
testing data necessary to prove a drug’s safety and efficacy by 
granting them a measure of certainty that they will enjoy a fixed 
amount of time during which they maintain proprietary control of 
the test data that resulted in the approval of its drug, before 
requiring that data be made available to generic imitators. Data 
exclusivity protection is crucial to biopharmaceutical innovation, 
and this innovation is crucial to the future of healthcare, trade, and 
economic prosperity. As technology changes to enable the 
development of new biologic vaccines and therapies, intellectual 
property protection must also evolve to ensure protection for these 
products. If we believe in the importance of biologic medicines for 
the future of healthcare, we must protect them with twelve years of 
 
 32. MEIR PEREZ PUGATCH ET AL., TAKING STOCK: HOW GLOBAL BIOTECHNOLOGY 
BENEFITS FROM INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 45 (2012). The Property Rights 
Index is arguably the most reputable and widely accepted criterion used to 
measure the cross-national strength of intellectual property rights. As calculated 
by Park, the index measures the cross-national strength of patent rights in 
122 nations between 1960 to 2005. The index ranges from zero, which indicates 
the weakest level of protection, to five, indicating the highest. Five categories of 
patent law are utilized to codify the index: extent of coverage, membership in 
international patent agreements, duration of protection, enforcement provisions, 
and restrictions on patent rights. Walter G. Park, International Patent Protection: 
1960–2005, 37 RES. POL’Y 761, 761 (2008). 
 33. PUGATCH ET AL., supra note 32, at 45. 
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data exclusivity. This time is essential for incentivizing investments 
in these technologies and rewarding the innovators who are willing 
to take these risks. 
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